Appearance
Transparency & warrant canary
Two commitments live on this page: a warrant canary we update on a schedule, and an annual transparency note. Both exist so that the absence of bad news is verifiable rather than assumed.
Warrant canary
Read the date, not the words
A canary is only meaningful if you check when it was last updated. If the date below is more than 45 days stale, treat the canary as failed and act accordingly — do not wait for an announcement, and do not accept an explanation that the update was "just delayed."
1NKY warrant canary — as of 2026-07-24
As of the date above, 1NKY has received:
- 0 subpoenas for user information
- 0 search warrants
- 0 court orders of any kind
- 0 National Security Letters
- 0 FISA court orders or directives
- 0 gag orders or non-disclosure orders
- 0 requests from any government for user data, formal or informal
- 0 requests to modify, backdoor, or weaken any part of the platform
- 0 requests to preserve user data pending legal process
1NKY has never turned over user data to any party. No searches or seizures of 1NKY servers or infrastructure have occurred. 1NKY remains under the control of its stated operators and has not been the subject of an acquisition, forced sale, or change of control.
This statement is current as of 2026-07-24 and will be reissued on or before 2026-09-07. The next scheduled reissue date is always stated in the statement itself.
Signature: TODO — canary statements will be cryptographically signed by the 1NKY site key once that key is published. Until then this canary is unauthenticated and should be weighted accordingly.
Pre-launch status
1NKY is not publicly launched yet. The zeros above are true and also easy to achieve, since there are no users to receive requests about. The canary is published now so that the format, the cadence and the reissue commitment are on the record before the first request ever arrives — a canary introduced after the fact is worth very little.
How the canary works
Cadence. Reissued at least every 45 days. Each statement names its own next reissue date, so you never have to guess what "on time" means.
Failure. If a statement is not reissued by its stated date, the canary has failed. We may be legally unable to tell you why, which is the entire point of the mechanism. A failed canary is not proof of a specific event; it's a signal to stop assuming the zeros still hold.
No silent edits. Canary text is versioned in the public docs repository. Every change to this page is a commit with a timestamp and a diff. You can read the whole history rather than trusting the current rendering.
Signing. TODO. Once the site key is published, each canary statement will be signed with it so a canary can't be forged by whoever controls the domain or the hosting account. Until that ships, this page's authenticity rests on the docs repo history and TLS, and we're saying so plainly rather than implying more.
Annual transparency note
Every calendar year, on or about 1 February, we publish a transparency note covering the prior year. Committed contents:
- Legal process received, by category and count: subpoenas, warrants, court orders, preservation requests, emergency disclosure requests, NSLs (to the extent reportable), foreign government requests.
- What we produced in response, by category — including, we expect, a lot of "nothing responsive existed."
- Takedown demands: DMCA notices and counter-notices received and acted on, plus non-DMCA removal demands.
- Content removed by us, in aggregate: moderation takedowns and bans by reason category.
- CSAM reports filed to the NCMEC CyberTipline, in aggregate count. Reporting is a legal obligation once we have actual knowledge, and we treat it as non-negotiable.
- Security incidents affecting user data or platform integrity, and what we did.
- Infrastructure and architecture changes that affect the privacy claims on these docs — for example, adding or removing a third party from the request path.
The note will state its own limitations. Where the law prohibits us from disclosing a category, we'll say that a prohibition exists to the extent we're permitted to, rather than reporting a misleading zero.
First note: February 2027, covering the period from launch.
What we would have to comply with
We're a US-connected operation and we're not pretending to be beyond the reach of law. Straight answers:
Valid legal process gets a response. A properly issued subpoena, warrant or court order with jurisdiction over us gets reviewed — by counsel, once counsel is engaged — and complied with where valid. We will push back on overbroad, defective or improperly served demands, and we'll seek to notify affected users where we're legally permitted to do so and where notification is technically possible. Note the second qualifier: with no email addresses on file, "notify the user" usually means a public notice on this page, because that's the only channel we have.
Valid takedown orders get honored. Court-ordered removals, and DMCA notices that meet the statutory requirements, are processed through the DMCA flow.
CSAM gets reported. Once we have actual knowledge, we report to the NCMEC CyberTipline and preserve the evidence bundle as required. Zero tolerance, no discretion, no exceptions, and it is the one area where we will act faster than any legal process requires.
Emergency requests involving an imminent risk of death or serious injury get reviewed immediately on their merits. We'll disclose whatever we actually have, which — see below — is very close to nothing.
What we cannot produce
Not "will not." Cannot. This isn't policy, it's the shape of the system, documented with verification steps on the no-logs page.
| Requested | Status |
|---|---|
| IP addresses (current or historical) | Never collected. No log, no column, no backup. |
| Email addresses | Never collected. There's no field for one anywhere. |
| Phone numbers | Never collected. |
| Real names, billing details, payment methods | Never collected. Nothing is sold. |
| Passwords / password hashes | Do not exist. There is no password system. |
| Login or session history | Do not exist. There are no sessions. |
| Device identifiers, ad IDs, fingerprints | Not collected. |
| Private keys / the ability to post as a user | Physically impossible — keys never leave the user's device. |
| Ability to decrypt a user's blackbook | Physically impossible — passphrase is never transmitted. |
| Analytics or behavioral profiles | Do not exist. No analytics of any kind is deployed. |
What does exist and could be produced: the public content itself — the same signed posts anyone can read on the site — and the public key that signed them. A public key is a number with no identity attached to it on our side.
Third parties are not covered by this table. Cloudflare sits at the edge of the clearnet site and processes visitor IPs transiently under their own policies; they can receive legal process independently of us, and we have no visibility into or control over that. Same for any hosting provider, which knows we rent a server. The onion mirror exists precisely so there's a path with no third party in it. We'd rather tell you where the seams are than claim there aren't any.
We cannot produce what we never collected. That sentence is the entire product strategy, and the verification section exists so it isn't just a sentence.
Contact
Legal process, transparency questions and press: contact details go live with launch (TODO — placeholder pending entity formation and counsel review). Security vulnerabilities go through responsible disclosure instead.